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The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), which entered into force on 1 November 2007, implies 
the abolition of the concentration rule regarding equity transactions so far in force in France. This rule, which 
was applied to varying degrees across Europe, resulted in the vast majority of order ﬂ  ow being concentrated 
in regulated markets, and notably in Euronext Paris for shares listed on the French stock exchange.
Over the coming years, order ﬂ  ow will become fragmented de facto as a result of being able to execute client 
orders on regulated markets as well as on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), and by use of systematic 
internalisers (SIs), which act as counterparties for transactions in the same way as market makers on 
price-driven markets such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE) or Nasdaq.
The competition between trading venues, which will be enhanced at the European level, has steadily 
been increasing since the 1970s. Since then, alternating series of regulations and technological progress 
have gradually weakened the monopolistic position of national regulated markets. The impact of this 
phenomenon has been a continuous fall in transaction costs, beneﬁ  ting investors and issuers of securities 
through a drop in the cost of capital. However, the fragmentation of order ﬂ  ow stemming from a proliferation 
of trading venues may raise concern about a reduction in market liquidity and a slowdown in the decline 
in transaction costs, which would run counter to the competitive effect between systems sought by the 
European regulatory authorities.
Although the most conservative medium-term scenarios point to continued dominance by regulated markets, 
we estimate that in the case of France, a very signiﬁ  cant share of order ﬂ  ow may rapidly be executed on 
alternative trading systems. Here, we focus on the impact on “wholesale” transactions, i.e. transactions 
of at least EUR 50,000, which we attribute to institutional investors. In particular, we identify the portion 
of these trades currently executed outside the order book. According to our estimates, these transactions 
constitute roughly 10% of the traded volume on CAC 40 shares and that may be lost to the regulated market 
each year. This volume, which would more or less equally be distributed between SIs and MTFs operating 
crossing systems, only constitutes a fraction of the total volume of the wholesale market.
The article is organised as follows. Section 1 presents the main drivers for competition between stock 
markets over the past 30 to 40 years. It describes in greater detail what constitutes the major issue over 
the coming years in terms of opening up to competition in Europe, i.e. MiFID, and addresses the economic 
implications of the new regulations. Section 2 proposes, for the most liquid shares on Euronext Paris, a 
preliminary estimate of wholesale order ﬂ  ow, i.e. block trades, which do not contribute to the price discovery 
process as they are currently executed outside the order book, and which could be executed on alternative 
trading facilities in the medium term.
NB: This document reﬂ  ects the personal views of its authors and does not necessarily represent those of the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Employment. The 
empirical analysis presented in this article was possible thanks to access to the Autorité des Marchés ﬁ  nanciers (AMF – Financial Markets Authority) database. 
The control and the analysis of the data and the conclusions drawn from the latter remain entirely under the responsibility of the authors and the AMF is in no 
way responsible.
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1| DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION 
  BETWEEN TRADING VENUES
1|1  Developments since the 1970s
Competition between stock markets has been 
increasing since the 1970s as a result of deregulation 
and technological progress, which have alternated 
in an almost cyclical fashion.
Initially, the regulatory authorities gave the necessary 
impetus to the opening-up and development of 
competition in securities trading, both in terms 
of the stock markets themselves, which generally 
were originally state-owned monopolies, and the 
intermediaries (brokers, banks, etc.).
In the United States, the deregulation of ﬁ  nancial 
markets began in 1975 with the elimination of ﬁ  xed 
commissions on stock market transactions, while 
this shift occurred later in Europe. The London Stock 
Exchange implemented the same type of reform 
in 1986 (the “Big Bang”), followed by the Société des 
Bourses françaises in 1989. In Europe as a whole, 
the 1993 European Investment Services Directive 
deﬁ  nitively placed trading activities in a competitive 
framework by putting professionals in charge of the 
functioning of markets.
Changes in the activities of traditional stock markets 
and, to a certain extent, the opening-up of foreign 
markets, have also fostered competition:
￿ Traditional stock markets have seen their role 
conﬁ  ned to providing price discovery, which is a role 
open to strong competition. The dematerialisation 
of securities (in France, the process, initiated in the 
late 1970s, became effective in 1984) considerably 
reduced the role of institutions that had controlled 
the whole chain of securities transactions from 
listing to clearing and settlement.
￿ The economic environment enabled investors 
and issuers to access foreign markets and to 
develop trade-off between equity markets. With 
the lifting of foreign exchange and price controls 
in the 1970s and 1980s, investors, particularly 
institutional investors, were able to broaden their 
international portfolios, while in Europe, the 
introduction of the euro made easier comparisons 
between companies in different countries. These 
two factors had a positive impact on competition 
between stock markets that had previously mainly 
served a domestic market.
The opening-up to competition led to major 
innovations in the sector and the emergence of 
players making use of new technologies. Stock 
exchanges sought to streamline their functioning, in 
most cases opting for electronic systems, which are 
less costly, substantially reduce human intervention, 
increase the capacity for processing orders and 
decentralise transactions, thus removing the need 
for physical presence in a dedicated building (closure 
of the Paris stock market’s Palais Brongniart in 1998 
after the Matif’s switch to electronic trading).1
Today, the United States is virtually the only place 
where trading ﬂ  oors still exist (NYSE, CBOE, CME, 
etc.). The development of electronic systems on 
the securities trading layer was also reinforced by 
the arrival of new players in the form of alternative 
trading systems (ATSs), including electronic 
communication networks (ECNs), which heightened 
competition among regulated markets.
In order to obtain the necessary ﬁ  nancing from private 
agents to develop electronic trading systems,2 stock 
exchanges changed their capital structure, ﬁ  rst via 
“demutualisation”, thus opening up their capital, initially 
held by their own members, and second, by becoming 
proﬁ  t-making companies, a number of these exchanges 
were listed on their own exchanges, enabling them to 
further diversify their holding structures. In 2001, the 
leading European stock exchanges (Euronext, Deutsche 
Börse, LSE) were listed on their own Bourse. This trend 
has continued elsewhere, with the NYSE going public in 
March 2006 and plans to go public by the Borsa Italiana 
and Bolsas y Mercados Españoles (BME). According 
to IOSCO,3 at the end of 2005, 16 stock exchanges 
1  In France, the CAC was launched in 1986 along the lines of the Canadian CATS system set up in the 1970s. Generally speaking, electronic systems were introduced 
in the mid-1990s (1995 in the case of Peru and India, 1996 for Mexico, South Africa, Luxembourg, Malta and Switzerland, 1997 for Germany, Brazil, Israel, 
1998 for Hungary, 1999 for Austria, Tokyo, etc.).
2  The London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse both spent over USD 100 million to implement their respective electronic systems, Sets and Xetra (see Domowitz 
and Steil, 1999).
3  IOSCO Consultation Report: “Regulatory issues arising from exchange evolution”, March 2006. The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
brings together the market regulators of 27 countries.ARTICLES
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or exchange holding companies (both in the cash and 
derivatives markets) were listed.
IPOs have also facilitated mergers between stock 
exchanges (see Figure 1). Mergers and partnerships 
sharply increased over the past two years and, 
following pan-European consolidation (Euronext, 
OMX), they are now taking place between US 
and European exchanges (NYSE-Euronext, 
Nasdaq-OMX), leading to stakes being taken by 
Middle-Eastern investors and stock exchanges 
(Borse Dubai and Qatar Investment Authority 
became stakeholders of the LSE). US regulations 
(Reg NMS, Sarbanes-Oxley, etc.) play a key role in 
the US regulated markets’ pursuit of critical mass 
and acquisition of new exchanges.
1|2  The Markets in Financial 
  Instruments Directive (MiFID)
In Europe, until the application of MiFID in 
November 2007, the concentration rule, stipulated in 
the Investment Services Directive (ISD 93/22/EEC), 
limited de facto competition in the securities trading 
layer. The rule requires that all equity transactions 
be carried out on a European regulated market 
(in practice usually the regulated market of the 
country concerned).4
Several Member States (including France, Germany, 
Spain, Italy and Belgium) have adopted this rule, 
with various exemptions. In the UK, where the rule 
was not applied, the regulated market competed 
both with banks, which execute a certain amount of 
transactions internally, and with ECNs such as the 
electronic trading system Virt-x. In Germany, the 
concentration rule was applied, while retaining the 
option allowing investors to opt out.
In spite of this rule, generally speaking, regulated 
domestic markets remain the only listing venue 
for domestic ﬁ  rms, and investors trade mostly on 
these markets, notably owing to matters related to 
language, information access and transaction costs.
In some cases, traditional stock exchanges’ position 
of monopoly or virtual monopoly at the national 
level has resulted in excessively high fees, both for 
issuers and investors. Noteworthy examples are 
the LSE, which was forced by the UK Ofﬁ  ce of Fair 
Trading to bring down annual fees charged to issuers 
by 25%, and Euronext Amsterdam, which reduced 
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4  In this case, the following criteria must be met: the investor must be habitually resident or established in that Member State; the investment ﬁ  rm must carry out such 
transactions through a main establishment, through a branch situated in that Member State or under the freedom to provide services in that Member State; and the 
transaction must involve an instrument dealt in on a regulated market in that Member State (Article 14, Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993).ARTICLES
Frédéric Cherbonnier and Séverine Vandelanoite: “The impact on ﬁ  nancial market liquidity of the markets in ﬁ  nancial instruments directive (MiFID)”
78  Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review – Special issue on liquidity ￿ No. 11 ￿ February 2008
trading fees by 30% in response to the launch of the 
new competitor Dutch Trading Services.
The situation is likely to change with the application 
of MiFID, leading to the abolition of the concentration 
rule and increased competition among regulated 
markets and other alternative facilities.
MTFs are the alternative facilities which organise 
the multilateral matching of third-party buying and 
selling interests like most regulated markets. MiFID 
also recognises “systematic internalisation”, meaning 
that investment ﬁ  rms act as intermediaries executing 
orders they receive from clients against their own book 
or against orders from other clients. By publishing 
continuous ﬁ  rm quotes for some equities, and the size 
at which it quotes, the bank sells/buys the securities 
when one of its clients sends a buy/sell order.
The future regulation establishes an overall operating 
framework ensuring the smooth functioning of 
the market and enhancing investor protection. In 
particular, it sets out a number of rules providing 
obligations in terms of transparency and quality of 
order execution:
￿ The “best execution” principle is deﬁ  ned as the 
obligation for intermediaries to make reasonable 
efforts to obtain the best possible result for their 
clients when executing orders. MiFID introduces a 
“multi-criteria” approach towards order execution 
conditions, deﬁ   ning the key aspects that the 
investment ﬁ  rm (IF) must take into account to ensure 
that they may obtain such a result, be it price, costs, 
speed and likelihood of execution and settlement, 
size, nature of the order or any other factor related 
to the execution of the order.5 In contrast, when 
the investment ﬁ  rm executes an order on behalf 
of a retail client, the best possible result is simply 
determined on the basis of the total costs.6 The latter 
mainly concerns SIs.
￿ Pre-trade transparency obligations require that 
regulated markets and MTFs publish quotes for listed 
securities, on a continuous basis, during normal 
trading hours. SIs are subject to this rule only for 
“liquid”7 securities of below “standard market size”.8 
Post-trade transparency obligations require that all 
these market players publish transaction information 
(price, volume, time) after execution.
In comparison with the system in place in the 
United States (see Appendix 1), European regulation 
provides a stricter framework aimed at limiting the 
development of private trading systems described 
as opaque in the United States, or “dark pools of 
liquidity”, which may erode liquidity on regulated 
markets and lead to a duality of investor classes. 
In particular, US pre-trade transparency obligations 
do not apply across the board, since the rule that 
requires an electronic system to publish a quote if 
it exceeds 5% of the traded volume in a security has 
been subject to exemptions (Liquidnet was granted 
an exemption).
Moreover, MiFID’s best execution requirements 
are based on the rules gradually implemented on 
the NYSE in 1981 (the “trade-through rule”) and on 
Nasdaq in 1997 (the order handling rule). However, 
the European regulation has the advantage of taking 
account of the transaction’s various components. 
As it is limited to the price criterion, its counterpart 
in the new US regulation, Reg NMS (an extension 
of the trade-through rule) makes reconciling the 
needs of retail and institutional investors difﬁ  cult. 
The latter will naturally seek to prevent their large 
orders from being executed against those of small 
investors (which would have an unfavourable impact 
on prices) by using dark pools of liquidity.
In theory, the “opacity” of these new systems 
affects the price discovery process, which no longer 
includes transaction data captured by these systems. 
Nevertheless, the use of algorithmic trading, 
which enables investors to track several trading 
systems around the clock, may limit the effects 
of fragmentation, although such strategies are not 
accessible to all investors.
5  Article 21 of Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004.
6  Article 44 of Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006.
7  A share admitted to trading on a regulated market shall be considered to have a liquid market if the share is traded daily, with a free ﬂ  oat of not less than 
EUR 500 million, and if one of the following conditions is satisﬁ  ed: the average daily number of transactions in the share is not less than 500; the average daily 
turnover for the share is not less than EUR 2 million (see Article 22 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1287/2006).
8  This threshold depends on the average value of orders executed (see Article 23 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1287/2006).ARTICLES
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1|3 The  economic  implications 
  of the new regulations
Financial market trends have implications beyond 
the ﬁ  nancial sector alone, insofar as an improvement 
in price discovery or an increase in competition in 
this sector would lead to a reduction in the cost of 
capital for listed ﬁ  rms. The latter could be achieved 
directly, via a reduction in transaction costs, which 
increases the net gains expected by the investors 
buying the securities. Thus, all things being equal, 
these investors would have to do with lower gross 
return. A decrease in the cost of capital may also 
result from a reduction of barriers to cross-border 
investment (decrease in the “home bias” leading to 
an improved diversiﬁ  cation of investments).
Economic gains stemming from a decrease in 
transaction costs may be substantial. Taking 
into account the current degree of automation of 
trading systems in Europe, Domowitz and Steil 
(2002) demonstrate that transaction costs could 
drop by 50% in the euro area (thanks to a reduction 
in explicit costs alone) which, taking account of 
the elasticity of the cost of capital, would make it 
possible to reduce the cost of capital for companies 
by almost  8%. For  France alone, a 10% decline 
in the cost of capital (i.e. around 80 basis points) 
would, according to the Treasury and Economic 
Policy General Directorate’s  (DGTPE) Mésange 
model, result in a 0.3% rise in GDP at the ﬁ  ve year 
horizon, meaning that the economic impact would 
be signiﬁ  cant.9
“Explicit” transaction costs can be estimated from 
the investor’s point of view by calculating the 
overall direct transaction costs buying or selling a 
security. These costs depend particularly on the 
organisation of the market, as well as on competition 
among IFs, which is contingent on how restrictive 
regulations are, and on taxation. In Paris, these 
costs can be obtained by referring to the advice of 
execution following each transaction, which lists the 
commission fees, VAT and stamp duty.
In addition to these expenses, indirect costs are 
related to the order execution conditions. These 
costs, known as “implicit”, are less easy to estimate 
and reﬂ  ect market “liquidity”.10 In practice, at least 
two components must be taken into account:11 the 
difference between an asset’s ask price and its bid 
price (the liquidity provider is compensated and 
earns income through the “bid-ask spread”) and 
the transaction’s impact on prices (the larger the 
order and the shallower the market, the greater the 
transaction’s impact on prices).
The overall impact of the new regulations (e.g. Reg NMS 
and MiFID) on transaction costs introducing competition 
among the different trading venues remains uncertain, 
as numerous mechanisms may be involved and may 
affect the market quality:
￿ By introducing competition among the different players, 
order ﬂ   ow fragmentation could lead to downward 
pressure on both direct and indirect transaction costs. 
Competition among liquidity providers leads to 
competition for the provision of best bid and best 
ask prices, while competition among the various 
trading venues reduces the monopoly rent which 
comprises, among other, access fees, and encourages 
the trading systems to innovate in order to reduce 
costs (Hamilton, 1979). An improvement in liquidity 
was indeed observed following the setting up of dual 
listing both on the London and Paris stock exchanges 
(traded on London’s SEAQI) at the beginning of the 
1990s of the most liquid shares on the French Bourse 
(Hamet, 1998).
However, order ﬂ  ow fragmentation between several 
trading systems should in theory mechanically result 
in reduced liquidity in the original market. According 
to the age-old rule “liquidity begets liquidity”, 
order ﬂ  ow consolidation should improve market 
quality whereas the opposite is true of order ﬂ  ow 
fragmentation. The coexistence of several competing 
markets is not viable; since investors are attracted 
to the most liquid market, the other markets should 
eventually close (Mendelson, 1987). Although 
this conclusion remains highly theoretical, and 
does not take into account a number of opposite 
effects discussed in this section, it does not detract 
from the fact that the internalisation of part of the 
order ﬂ  ow has a negative impact on liquidity if 
these orders no longer participate in the process of 
price discovery.
9  For an assessment of the impact at the European level, see the report ordered by the European Commission (2002): “Quantiﬁ  cation of the macro-economic impact 
of integration of EU ﬁ  nancial markets”, London Economics.
10  For a more detailed explanation of market liquidity, see Bervas (2006).
11  Ideally, the time factor should be taken into account (speed of order execution), though the most measures available at present only include the two factors 
mentioned above.ARTICLES
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￿  The coexistence of several competing trading 
systems, with distinctive operational characteristics, 
should help to fulﬁ  l the heterogeneous needs of the 
various types of investors (in terms of cost, execution 
times, order size, etc.). The coexistence of several 
markets is therefore theoretically possible if the 
most liquid market is also the most expensive, thus 
attracting the largest market players, as is the case 
for the block trading market (see Pagano, 1989). The 
heterogeneity of investor preferences is conﬁ  rmed 
by the Institutional Investor’s annual survey of 
traders working in fund management companies.12
Conversely, order leakage could cause market quality 
to deteriorate. This would notably be the case if 
SIs skewed the nature of order ﬂ  ow by attracting 
“uninformed” clients on whom they make a proﬁ  t 
(“cream skimming”). In theory, uninformed investors 
are indispensable to the price discovery process. 
To remove such investors from the main market 
would lead to a deterioration of market quality, with 
liquidity providers widening quoted bid-ask spreads 
when they ﬁ  nd better-informed agents.13 This would 
have an impact on internalised orders which would 
in turn be more expensive as they are based on 
market prices.
Beyond these general arguments, it must be borne in mind 
that the effects of order ﬂ  ow fragmentation can differ 
greatly according to the security being dealt. An asset’s 
initial liquidity (in terms of traded volume, bid-ask 
spread, etc.) is a key factor. According to Bennett and 
Wei (2006), the less liquid the security, the greater the 
impact of increased fragmentation on the volatility 
of a security’s price and the transaction costs.
The Elkins-McSherry analysis of equity transaction costs 
conﬁ  rms how difﬁ  cult it is to anticipate the impact of 
regulations. During the period from June 2005 to 
July 2006, stocks listed on the NYSE, on the Nasdaq 
and the Japanese stock exchanges recorded the lowest 
transaction costs, with France in ﬁ  fth position behind 
Germany. The UK ranks seventh if the sell side of 
transactions alone is taken into consideration.14
In the case of Germany, fragmentation seems to have 
resulted in a low market impact and high commission fees, 
contrary to certain theories previously highlighted in this 
paper. Competition is established in Germany both 
within the regulated Deutsche Börse’s dual system 
(where the electronic system Xetra15 competes with 
the ﬂ  oor trading of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange), 
between the main regulated market and the seven 
small regional stock markets (Düsseldorf, Munich, 
Hamburg, Hanover, Stuttgart, Berlin and Bremen), 
and due to the option to opt out of the concentration 
rule (this option allows 50% of traded volume to be 
executed outside the regulated market).
All in all, Germany is well-positioned in terms of 
liquidity, which seems to indicate that fragmentation has 
not caused market quality to deteriorate.16 In contrast, 
Germany has relatively high direct costs (16.24 bp) 
while the vertical structure of the Deutsche Börse, 
which also controls clearing and settlement, should 
enable signiﬁ  cant economies of scope to be achieved.
Figure 2
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12  Elkins-McSherry ranks securities trading systems according to the overall quality of order execution services. It appears that institutional investors prefer electronic 
systems to traditional stock exchanges. Traditional stock exchanges (Nasdaq and NYSE) rank last, behind electronic systems (ECNs and crossing networks).
13  This is referred to as the “adverse selection component of the bid/ask spread” (see Kyle, 1985).
14  Stamp duty is systematically charged on acquisitions, which brings the fees component to 49.91 bp, compared to 0.52 bp for sales. As a result, in reality, the 
UK stock market ranks far below the other leading stock markets.
15  Xetra has a market share of between 92% and 97% of transaction volumes on the DAX and the MDAX, see Factbook 2005, Deutsche Börse AG, p49.
16  Another explanatory factor appears to be the very small tick size (EUR 0.001 for securities of between EUR 0.001 and 0.249 and EUR 0.01 for securities of over 
EUR 0.25).ARTICLES
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2| E MPIRICAL ESTIMATE 
  OF POST-MIFID 
  ORDER FLOW FRAGMENTATION
2|1 The  post-MiFID  landscape 
 is  difﬁ  cult to predict
It is difﬁ  cult to form a clear picture of the European 
stock market landscape in the medium term (three 
to ﬁ  ve years). A number of major potential scenarios 
emerge, but no single hypothesis dominates. For 
instance, although the current models are fairly 
heterogeneous in Europe, notably due to the 
differences in the application of the concentration 
rule (see Section 1|2), regulated markets predominate 
in terms of market share thanks, most often, to the 
efﬁ  ciency of fully automated systems. Contrary to 
what has been observed in the US since the early 
1990s with the launch of Electronic computer 
networks (ECNs), competition based solely on new 
technology would therefore not be possible.
In Europe, due to the technological advantage of 
regulated markets, the conservative assumption 
whereby they will continue to predominate is the 
most commonly held. Investors are not willing to use 
other trading systems that do not appear to beneﬁ  t 
from the same liquidity pool that characterises 
traditional stock exchanges, even some MTFs would 
offer an innovative organisation of the transactions. 
Moreover, in countries applying the concentration 
rule, intermediaries report all transactions to 
the regulated domestic market, which sends the 
information to the regulatory authorities. Following 
the implementation of MiFID, since IFs will be 
directly responsible for reporting transactions, 
it might be easier for them to continue executing 
clients’ orders on the regulated market, which 
already proposes the infrastructures to report to the 
competent authorities and would be responsible for 
reporting obligations.
The ongoing consolidation observed over recent 
years within Europe, as well as between European 
and US stock markets, should enable regulated 
markets to offer an increasingly deeper liquidity pool 
to investors and beneﬁ  t from advantages related to 
economies of scale. These markets would therefore 
be in a position to maintain their domination.
However, the launch or the announcement in recent 
months of the creation of a certain number of alternative 
trading systems, meaning post-MiFID MTFs, heralds a 
more fragmented European stock market landscape.
A number of these new systems differ relatively 
little to those offered by the regulated markets, 
as they are based on an automated order book; 
competition will therefore depend on speed and/or 
cost criteria. This is the case for Chi-X, launched 
by Instinet, which is already active in countries 
that do not apply the concentration rule, and 
which should, in November 2007, propose a central 
limit order book (CLOB) for 7,500 pan-European 
securities. Likewise, Equiduct, primarily owned by 
Börse Berlin, is based on an up-to-date version of the 
defunct trading platform Easdaq, with a hybrid order 
book ﬁ  lled up by market makers and limit order 
providers. Project Turquoise, launched by seven 
major investment banks, including Merrill Lynch 
and Goldman Sachs, should be an alternative trading 
platform for European equities.17
Other competitors are expected to attract institutional 
investors, which execute transactions involving a 
large number of securities and for which the major 
criterion is to obtain a sufﬁ  ciently large counterparty 
without revealing their position to the other market 
players. These systems are expected to develop 
along the same lines as dark pools of liquidity in 
the United States, i.e. electronic platforms that seek 
to match buy and sell orders anonymously, without 
displaying the orders publicly. Nevertheless the 
MiFID transparency requirements would bound their 
opacity. These private trading systems, organised 
outside the regulated markets, are mainly targeting 
buy-side investors,18 and less frequently sell-side 
players.19 Often organised as crossing systems, their 
originality in terms of “natural” counterparty searching 
methods could beneﬁ  t institutional investors.
The largest project announced to date is that of 
ITG with its Posit Now platform, launched in 
February 2007. As of 1 November 2007, in the same 
vein as its US counterpart, it will offer fund managers 
17  The system’s launch, initially scheduled for end-2007, has nonetheless been postponed to the second quarter of 2008.
18  The buy-side includes all investors, i.e. institutional investors (pension funds, investment funds, insurance companies, etc.) and retail investors.
19  The sell-side includes intermediaries, which act on behalf of investors. These include investment companies (brokers), stock exchanges, market makers, 
exchanges members, etc.ARTICLES
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continuous intraday crossing and total anonymity, on 
9,000 securities in 15 countries. Posit Now will compete 
with Liquidnet Europe, which only focuses on the 
buy-side for block trades and covers 18 countries.20
The emergence of SIs is more uncertain, on account 
of the demanding requirements associated to this 
status (regulatory capital, information disclosure 
rules, operating mode, etc). IFs must weigh up 
the cost of developing an SI activity against the 
income generated. Only the largest banks will 
be able to reach the critical mass allowing them 
to earn the bid/ask spread at a lower cost, while 
others could target certain listed securities or 
certain types of investors offering greater potential 
gains. For instance, a number of players are likely 
to specialise in wholesale clients as, according to 
MiFID, pre-trade transparency rules will not apply to 
SIs for the trading of the most liquid shares identiﬁ  ed 
by the directive,21 while others will offer systematic 
internalisation for the other “illiquid” securities for 
the same reason.
As a result, it is difﬁ  cult to assess the impact of MiFID, 
particularly since certain markets are likely to be 
less affected as they are already facing competition. 
Conversely, France exercised so far considerable 
control over its order ﬂ  ow, given that virtually all 
of its orders had to be executed on Euronext Paris, 
allowing a few exceptions which nonetheless respect 
the requirement of reporting to Euronext.
2|2 A  ﬁ  rst estimation 
  of fragmentation in France
Concentrating the reporting of transactions in a single 
venue provides a means of analysing and identifying 
order ﬂ  ow that, depending on their characteristics 
(size, broker identity, execution facility), may make 
them eligible for execution on an alternative trading 
system as of 1 November 2007.
Estimates of the possible fragmentation from this 
data are based on the observation that MiFID will 
primarily enable professionals, i.e. institutional 
investors, to choose the venue for the execution of 
their buy and sell orders. These investors represent 
the largest part of trading volume, with 93% of 
French and foreign securities traded in France 
in 2006 –excluding non-residents.22 In view of the fact 
that individual trades usually involve considerable 
amounts, initiatives such as Liquidnet or Posit are 
exclusively aimed at large institutional investors, 
offering them block trading networks. This clientele 
is also likely to be favoured by SIs, which could 
directly negotiate the transaction price.
This “wholesale market” is therefore a key element 
for assessing the potential degree of fragmentation in 
the French market, particularly from the point of view 
of IFs and their future clients’ order ﬂ  ow management, 
in compliance with best execution requirements. 
In order to assess the share of order ﬂ  ow likely to 
permanently migrate from the French regulated 
market, we propose analysing the equivalent of the 
wholesale market currently identiﬁ  able on Euronext 
Paris,  via block trades and “cross trades” (these 
particular trades are called “applications” on Euronext 
Paris), which, although restricted by the quoted prices 
from the central order book, are potentially large (see 
Appendix 3). These transactions represent one type 
of order ﬂ  ow already executed outside the order book 
and do not enter into the price discovery process.
Our analysis is carried out on Euronext Paris 
market data transmitted regularly to the Autorité des 
Marchés ﬁ  nanciers (AMF –France’s Financial Markets 
Authority). This data, which enables the identifying 
of brokers for each transaction, has the advantage 
of recording transactions executed outside the order 
book, on the basis of brokers’ reports, which are 
therefore invisible to the rest of the market at the 
date of transaction.
The analysis is conducted for the period from 
July 2005 to June 2007 and for transactions of a 
minimum amount of EUR 50,000, referred to as 
“block trades” in the rest of this article, which is 
the threshold that corresponds to the minimum 
trade size (normal block amount –NBA) for an 
order to be eligible for block trades for the category 
of least liquid securities, i.e. those that are traded 
periodically by single-price call auctions. We focus 
on the transaction counterparties, i.e. whether such 
trades involve two clients of the same IF or if the IF 
executes the transaction against its own book. The 
20  According to Liquidnet Europe, the system has a liquidity pool of 3.5 billion securities, and the trading volume increased by over 350% in 2006, with an average 
cost reduction of 21.3 bp on each trade.
21  See Section 1|2.
22  According to the Banque de France securities survey. Institutional investors correspond to banks, insurance companies, pension funds and UCITS.ARTICLES
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former are likely to be directly executed on an MTF 
like a crossing system or routed to a platform such 
as Project Turquoise, owned by IFs, while the latter 
should directly qualify as internalised trades.
Therefore, by measuring order ﬂ  ow lost to a certain 
extent by Euronext Paris, we seek to identify orders 
that are likely to be executed outside the regulated 
market after 1 November 2007. In practice, this 
amount could be much greater if the block trades 
currently executed in the order book were taken 
into account.
BLOCK TRADES REPORTED IN EURONEXT’S TRADE 
CONFIRMATION SYSTEM (TCS)
The concentration rule, which was strictly applied in 
France, required, until 1994, that all orders executed 
on the Paris stock exchange, transmitted by a broker 
established in France on behalf of an investor residing 
in France, be executed on a regulated market. 
However, institutional investors, discouraged by 
the high level of transparency that characterised the 
Paris Bourse, were trading executing block trades on 
the LSE. The Stock Exchange Automated Quotation 
International system (SEAQI) enabled them to trade 
security blocks at prices directly negotiated with 
the market makers in London, without revealing 
information to the other market players.
The Paris stock exchange consequently took a number 
of steps in the mid-1990s aiming to allow block trades 
to be executed outside the central order book, so as to 
guarantee investors a certain degree of opacity.23 These 
transactions must nonetheless be reported to Euronext 
Paris and recorded via the TCS reporting system (see 
Appendix 3). Euronext’s TCS is more generally used to 
adjust and report trades executed outside the central 
order book in Euronext’s system.24
In order to assess the share of a Paris’ wholesale 
transactions already executed outside the central order 
book, we analyse a limited number of transactions 
reported in the TCS. These transactions are classiﬁ  ed 
as “block trades –out session”.25 To avoid taking into 
account small transactions executed outside trading 
hours in this category, only trades involving a 
minimum amount of EUR 50,000 are included.
The analysis for the July 2005-June 2007 period26 shows 
that block trades represented around 8% of the total 
turnover (value of trades) in the central order book, with 
an average of 105 transactions per trading session 
(see Figure 3). Moreover, the block trading market 
is highly concentrated, both in terms of number of 
Figure 3
Turnover in block trades with a minimum value 
of EUR 50,000 reported in the TCS
Average daily turnover of Euronext Paris listed securities
(EUR millions)
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Note: the average daily turnover on NSC includes turnover for trades on Euronext 
Paris as well as on Euronext’s other stock exchanges, notably Amsterdam and 
Brussels. Turnover abroad is nonetheless very limited and do not signiﬁ  cantly 
skew the statistics presented.
Source: SESAM database
23  For a more precise deﬁ  nition of price and volume conditions please refer to Chapter 4 of Euronext Rule Book 1, harmonised provisions.
24  See AMF Monthly Review No. 10 January 2005 (in French).
25  See Euronext Cash Market – Guide to transaction reporting 2007.
26  Only transactions of over EUR 50,000 are included here. This threshold corresponds to the minimum level required for transactions on securities traded by call 
auctions to be eligible for block trades. The thresholds are nonetheless much higher on other securities (see Appendix 3). Reported transactions that were executed 
below the regulatory thresholds actually occurred outside trading hours and belong to the “out of session” category. They are also reported via Euronext Trade 
Conﬁ  rmation System (TCS), in the same category as block trades. Furthermore, only French or foreign shares listed on Euronext Paris are included here.ARTICLES
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securities and the number of IFs acting as broker 
and maybe dealer for these block trades:
￿ only 30 securities listed on Euronext Paris (which 
listed some 730 companies at end-2006) account for 
80% of transactions. More generally, the 50 most traded 
stocks outside the market are listed on Euronext’s Blue 
Chip large cap index, and also, in the case of 36 of 
them, are components of the CAC 40 index.
￿  98% of transactions of over EUR 50,000 are 
concentrated among 25 IFs out of a total of some 
90 IFs operating acting as broker-dealers for block 
trades over the past two years.
Block trades are executed outside the regulated market 
so that investors beneﬁ  t from advantageous execution 
conditions, such as the non-disclosure of their position 
to the rest of the market, an advantageous transaction 
price and non-fragmented execution. Most often 
the IF is the investor’s counterparty in the transaction, 
or else acts as a simple broker between clients. As a 
result, 98% of block trades of over EUR 50,000 are 
carried out by the same broker on both sides of the 
trade. In almost 70% of cases, the IF executes orders 
against its own account, which means that it acts as an 
SI (see Figure 4). Such trades represent an average of 
EUR 252 million per day.
Although there are less than half as many, transactions 
between clients of the same IF represent an average 
of EUR 164 million per day. This signiﬁ  cant order 
ﬂ   ow might migrate from the regulated market 
after implementation of MiFID, gravitating towards 
MTFs organised as crossing systems, thus enabling 
investors to avoid the use of a physical broker.27
BLOCK TRADES EXECUTED AT MARKET PRICE 
OUTSIDE THE ORDER BOOK
A “cross trade” consists of the simultaneous matching 
and execution by the same IF of opposing buy and sell 
orders (see Appendix 3). By deﬁ  nition, cross trades 
are not block trades, since they are assumed to be 
executed at market prices. Given that they have 
no maximum or minimum size limit, very small 
transactions can be executed in the same way as 
transactions corresponding to equity block trades. As 
regards securities listed on the Paris stock exchange’s 
benchmark index, the CAC 40, data analysed represent 
around 4% of total turnover on the CAC 40 executed in 
the central order book (see Figure 5).
Like for block trades, only cross trades with a 
minimum value of EUR 50,000 are analysed. In this 
subset, which represents 44% of all cross trades and 
an average of 72 transactions per day, the average 
transaction size is EUR 2.7 million, i.e. less than 
two-thirds the amount of an average block trade.28
Cross trades are characterised by a very marked 
concentration on a limited number of securities: in 
turnover terms, between July 2005 and June 2007, 
almost 85% were carried out on 25 securities listed 
on the CAC 40. IFs in this sector are more highly 
concentrated than in the block trading market. 
Almost as many IFs active on the cross-trades 
Figure 4
Breakdown of block trades exceeding EUR 50,000 



















Note  : Block trades can be carried out between two clients of the same IF 
(client-to-client transaction) or between the client and the IF (client-to-house transaction). 
Less frequently, transactions are carried out internally (house-to-house transaction) or 
between the IF and one of its subsidiaries (house-to-parent transaction).
Source: SESAM database
27  However, this does not eliminate explicit transaction costs, as each investor has to pay to access the MTF.
28  The average size of transactions of over EUR 50,000 recorded in TCS under “block trades – out of session” is EUR 4.48 million. For CAC 40 securities alone, the 
average transaction size in this category is EUR 5.5 million.ARTICLES
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segment can be found on the block trade market. 
Nonetheless, over 90% of the total turnover in cross 
trades is handled by just 10 IFs.
Moreover, in practice, over 50% of these cross trades 
are executed against IFs’ own accounts. As a result, 
like for certain block trades, these transactions are 
already de facto internalised, since the transaction 
price satisﬁ  es constraints of MiFID. Although the 
number of transactions carried out between the 
client and the IF for its own account is higher than 
that of transactions between clients, the latter has 
amounted to an average of EUR 97 million per day 
over the past two years compared to EUR 69 million 
for the former (see Figure 6).
A CONFIGURATION LIKELY TO RESULT IN FRAGMENTATION
Whether competitors to regulated markets emerge 
as of November 2007 will depend on the capacity 
of alternative trading systems to meet the needs of 
institutional investors in particular. Whether IFs decide 
to develop SI activities or not will depend on their 
achieving critical mass thanks to their retail clients 
and above all on volume that they will be capable of 
trading with institutional investors.
The summary of order ﬂ  ow observed on Euronext 
Paris shows that the great majority of block trades 
and a signiﬁ  cant share of cross trades are on CAC 40 
securities. Block trades of over EUR 50,000 executed 
by an IF, either as a counterparty or involving two of 
its clients, averaged EUR 1,285 billion per year for 
the July 2005-June 2007 period on CAC 40 securities 
alone. In comparison with Euronext’s centralised 
system, this represents around 10% of the yearly 
turnover on CAC 40 securities and could be lost by the 
French regulated market in the medium term.
The order ﬂ   ow, characterised by the strong 
concentration of both investors and equities traded, 
and which currently does not participate in the price 
discovery process on Euronext, is therefore signiﬁ  cant. 
The estimates obtained provide initial indications of 
the impact of the implementation of MiFID:
￿ The number of SIs on liquid securities listed on 
Euronext Paris could be between ﬁ  ve and ten in the 
medium term, and represent currently 5% of per 
annum turnover on CAC 40 securities. Although there 
Figure 5
Cross trades on Euronext Paris on CAC40 equities
Breakdown of average daily turnover by cross trade 
and in the total central order book
(EUR millions)
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are many IFs acting as broker-dealer between clients 
on CAC 40 securities (90 IFs during the period under 
review), only 40 of them execute trades on behalf of 
clients against their own book. Nonetheless, only ﬁ  ve 
of these IFs dominate the market, accounting for almost 
80% of turnover.
￿  Institutional investors could carry out around 
6% of their annual turnover on MTFs organised as 
crossing systems if they decide to post their orders 
on a dedicated alternative system.29
Finally, as this purely statistic analysis cannot 
give a dynamic estimate of order ﬂ  ow trends in 
a post-MiFID landscape, it constitutes an initial 
estimate of the volume of wholesale trades likely 
to be executed outside the French regulated market 
in the next few years. Since these trades do not 
participate in Euronext’s price discovery process 
because of their current execution conditions, the 
impact on the regulated market’s liquidity is likely 
to be limited.
Nevertheless, our analysis probably underestimates 
the volume likely to be lost by Euronext. Indeed, 
only a “hidden” share of the wholesale market is 
taken into account: block trades executed in the order 
book and those executed outside the order book by 
non-residents (not subject to reporting requirements) 
or by residents on another regulated market (such 
as SEAQI) are not included.
29  For transactions reported in TCS, our statistics include only trades involving the same IF on both sides of the transaction. Two percent of the total volume is therefore 
not taken into account in our calculations, which may produce a slight downward bias to estimates of order ﬂ  ow transiting via a crossing system following the 
implementation of MiFID on 1 November 2007.
Figure 7
Summary of equity trading on the CAC 40 broken down 
by cross trades and block trades of over EUR 50,000
Turnover and average number of trades per day
(EUR millions)
Block trades Cross trades
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APPENDIX 1
The development of ﬁ  nancial markets in the United States
The emergence of competition in the United States is closely linked to the history of the deregulation of ﬁ  nancial markets. 
In 1975, the US Congress passed amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that sought to create a 
National Market System (NMS) which, though the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) linked the different stock 
exchanges and allowed investors to execute in theory their orders on the market providing the best quotes.1
The structure of US equity market at that time consisted of a main market, the NYSE, and smaller “regional” 
exchanges. All these exchanges were manual auction markets, with a unique dealer on the NYSE, the “specialist” 
who is the only one in his specialty stocks, competing with limit order traders and dealers at other exchanges. In 
these conditions, the price was the most important dimension of order execution. Consequently, the members 
of ITS opted in 1981 for the “trade-through rule”, whereby trading at a price other than the best one posted on 
any market in a security (a seller must sell at the highest bid price on any market, while the buyer must buy 
at the lowest offer price).2
The trade-through rule, which applied to the trading of NYSE and other exchange-listed securities but not 
Nasdaq-listed securities, paradoxically protected the NYSE from competition (in particular electronic communication 
networks (ECNs) that could never trade more than 5% of the trading volume in NYSE-listed securities). De facto, 
this best price criterion meant that orders were routed to the NYSE that indeed offered many times the best 
quotes (due to the ﬁ  erce competition between brokers). Hence, competitors could not enter the market even if, 
eventually, the transaction price did not correspond to the quoted price because the best bid or offer may be gone 
before the order is executed. A quoted price can disappear or change long before an execution happens.
As of the end of the 1990s, the United States adopted a number of rules aiming to promote competition between 
traditional exchanges with a view to ensuring the best execution of customer orders, while guaranteeing investor 
protection. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initially focused on Nasdaq. In 1997, it established 
new order handling rules for Nasdaq market makers following an investigation revealing practices that were 
detrimental to investors:3
￿ The limit order display rule greatly increased the transparency of Nasdaq by requiring market makers to display 
customer limit orders that are priced better than the market maker’s quote, or add to the size of a market 
maker’s quote when the market maker is at the best price in the market.
￿ The quote rule has enabled ECNs to directly compete with Nasdaq market makers through the inclusion of 
their prices in the public quotation system. This rule, also known as ECN Amendment, requires market makers 
to publicly display (on Nasdaq) the price of any orders they place on an ECN if the price is better than their own 
public quotation. The ECN may also communicate the best priced orders entered by Nasdaq market makers 
to a traditional exchange (ECN Display Alternative),4 which must then display them.
1  The National Market System established electronic linkages between existing exchanges (mainly for securities listed on the NYSE and AMEX) which Congress qualiﬁ  ed as 
a public utility that must be adequately regulated. Henceforth, NMS securities are all listed on Nasdaq and on stock exchanges (Self-regulated organizations –SROs).
2  This rule was established due to the practice of “trading through” one exchange for stock being sold/bought at a slightly higher/lower price on another.
3  See article published in 1994 by Christie (W.) and Schultz (P.): “Why do Nasdaq market makers avoid odd-eighth quotes?”, Journal of Finance, 49, 1813-1840, according 
to which Nasdaq market makers were implicitly colluding to keep spreads artiﬁ  cially wide (at least USD 0.25 whereas the tick size was USD 0.125).
4  See Special Studies: “Report concerning display of customer limit orders”, May 2000 and “Electronic communication networks and after-hours trading”, June 2000, 
Securities and Exchange Commission.ARTICLES
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￿ Regulation ATS (alternative trading systems) adopted in December 1998 ﬁ  nally integrated ECNs and ATSs more 
fully into the NMS by allowing them to register as a broker-dealer or an exchange.
The impact on the development of ECNs was considerable and the increase in competition largely beneﬁ  cial to investors. 
While in 1993, ECNs accounted for 13% of trading volume on Nasdaq, their share rose to 30% in 1999 and 
has reached 50% in recent years.5 Even though it 
is difﬁ  cult to distinguish between the effects of the 
two main rules of 1997, it appears that, following 
the implementation of the new rules, the number 
of reported quotes increased sharply and bid-ask 
spreads reduced on Nasdaq.6 The latter effect is due 
to the fact that market makers posted, before the new 
rules, orders on ECNs that were only available to 
institutional investors, which represented a limited 
number of players.
Following this fragmentation, exchanges lost market 
share in the total turnover of their own listed stocks, but 
also penetrated the market of their historical competitors. 
Since Nasdaq started to offer, in January 2004, the 
dual-listing of a number of NYSE-listed stocks, 
competition between the two exchanges has 
become head-on. AMEX then adopted the same 
dual-listing system. There is therefore an asymmetry 
with the NYSE, as the latter does not authorise 
the trading of Nasdaq-listed securities. The NYSE 
regularly lost market share to Nasdaq, before regaining 
it through its merger with ArcaEx (Archipelago 
Exchange) in 2006 (see Figure A1).
In February 2004, the SEC proposed Regulation 
National Market System (Reg NMS) designed to 
enhance and modernize the regulatory structure of 
the US equity markets and formally approved it in 
June 2005.7 Indeed, overlapping regulation gave rise 
to different possibilities for trading securities with, 
at one extreme, centralisation (the NYSE and the 
trade-through rule, with a ﬂ  oor structure making 
it geographically concentrated) and, at the other, 
fragmentation (Nasdaq and its electronic system).
This new regulation has notably extended the 
trade-through rule to Nasdaq-listed securities, but 
applies only to automated quotes. This measure aims to 
Figure A1
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Sources: NYSE, Nasdaq Performance Report
5  In May 2004, Inet capital captured 25% of trading volumes on Nasdaq, ArcaEx 19% and Brut 9%, according to Securities Industry News.
6  See McInish (T.), Van Ness (B.) and Van Ness (R.) (1998): “The effect of the SEC’s order-handling rules on Nasdaq”, Journal of Financial Research 21(3), pp. 247-254.
7  The regulation covers four areas: the execution and processing of orders (order protection rule), access to quotes throughout the NMS (access rule), the deﬁ  nition 
of price increments (sub-penny rule) and the management and distribution of market data (market data rule). Reg NMS extends the trade-through rule 
to Nasdaq-listed securities.ARTICLES
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protect customer limit orders. The main argument put forward by advocates of the trade-through rule is that it ensures 
that small orders at the best price are not ignored, in particular by large investors seeking a major counterparty.8 
The scope of application of this rule has been broadened to all US listed securities, but above all, applies now only 
to automated quotes and no longer to manual quotes. This means that the NYSE trading ﬂ  oor will no longer beneﬁ  t 
from this protection.
Having been forced to respond to competition from ECNs (by opting for a hybrid auction and electronic system 
in the case of the NYSE) and take account of Reg NMS that favours automated quotes, exchanges have entered 
into a consolidation process following a period of fragmentation. Nasdaq acquired Brut in September 2004 and 
Inet in December 2005. For its part, the NYSE acquired Archipelago ECN in 2006. Consolidation is already 
underway among ECNs, with the number of SEC-registered ECNs falling from nine in December 1999 to 
ﬁ  ve in July 2004. Furthermore, in order to adapt to the new environment, a number of regional exchanges 
(Philadelphia and Chicago) are seeking to launch their own electronic systems.
8  Opponents of this rule argue that the technological development of markets, by gradually removing human intervention, has considerably broadened best execution 
criteria, if only by introducing a time factor (speed of execution). Under these conditions, Nasdaq market makers have been subject, to date, to broad best execution 
requirements more or less corresponding to those recommended by MiFID. From this point of view, the United States has regressed: Reg NMS limits best execution 
to ensuring the best price for all listed securities.ARTICLES
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APPENDIX 2
The development of transaction costs
The annual “Global Trading Cost Analysis” survey, conducted by Elkins-McSherry and published by Institutional 
Investor Magazine, provides estimates of equity transaction costs.
These data incorporate the direct costs and part of the indirect costs, known as the market impact, which includes 
the midpoint price of the bid/ask spread and a measure of the average price shift beyond the best limit price 
(comparing the actual average price for a block trade with the volume-weighted average price –the mean of 
day’s high, low, opening and closing prices– of the stock in question). The data are collected from institutional 
investors trading on 208 exchanges in 42 countries.
However, due to the way these data are collected, their nature and the calculation of transaction costs, a degree 
of caution should be exercised regarding Elkins-McSherry data. The transactions making up the database are 
only representative of institutional investors, which tends to overestimate market impact (which is high for 
these investors that generally post large orders) and underestimate explicit costs (as fees are usually lower for 
these investors thanks to their bargaining power).
Another limitation lies in the fact that transaction costs are presented as an average per country (and not by 
exchange, without distinguishing between transactions carried out on a regulated market or OTC), and for 
all listed shares (without distinguishing between small and large caps). It is therefore difﬁ  cult to attribute a 
transaction cost to a particular exchange, especially in countries characterised by multiple trading venues such 
as the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States.
Despite these limitations, Elkins-McSherry data provide very useful indications of transaction costs, showing 
in particular that they have declined on average by almost 40% since 1996 worldwide. This decrease was 
most marked for implicit costs, which fell by 55% 
compared with 30% for fees and commissions. Over 
the recent period, implicit costs have appeared to 
account for only a quarter of transaction costs.1
The main driver for this cost reduction appears to be 
the automation-driven disintermediation of trading, 
which suggests that this decrease has probably been 
underway on and off since the end of the 1970s.2 
Indeed, all things being equal, electronic-based 
markets have signiﬁ  cantly lower average transaction 
costs than their non-automated counterparts. Over 
the period 1996-1998, trading cost savings appear 
to be between 23 and 32bp on explicit costs, and 
between 10 and 18bp on implicit costs.
Commissions and fees have been falling steadily 
thanks to technological advances and the growing 
Changes in global trading costs
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Note: Explicit costs correspond to direct costs. Implicit or indirect costs are 
estimated by the market impact and are negatively correlated with liquidity.
Source: Elkins-McSherry.
1  This proportion is found at the disaggregated level for all countries, except at the end of the 1990s in North America, where the proportions were opposite (Domowitz 
et al., 2001).
2  Elkins-McSherry data only go back to 1996.ARTICLES
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competition between intermediaries. However, the implicit component, represented by the market impact, is 
subject to more erratic ﬂ  uctuations and remains more difﬁ  cult to “control” by exchanges as it is correlated with price 
volatility and trading activity. For instance, a sharp rise in implicit costs was observed in 2000 and 2001, due to 
the exceptionally high volatility during this period, making it difﬁ  cult to execute orders at the best price. This 
situation was exacerbated by the massive sell-offs observed at that time, as empirically the cost of selling is 
higher than that of buying.3
Unlike the situation observed on other markets, in the case of Euronext implicit costs have not returned to 
the level prevailing before this period of high volatility. The decline in these prices may have been less rapid 
because of Euronext’s minimum tick size, which skews the measure of implicit costs used by Elkins-McSherry. 
While all US (and German) exchanges have moved to decimalisation, Euronext retains a pricing grid whereby 
the tick size increases with the share price. Only securities of up to EUR 50 have a minimum tick size of 
EUR 0.01.4 There are no doubt other factors behind this relatively small decline in implicit costs.
The decline in implicit costs has nevertheless been more marked in France since 2001, even though Paris 
was still far in 2005 from the exceptionally low levels prevailing before 2000. This result is consistent with 
observations by Pagano and Padilla (2005)5 showing that the average bid-ask spread of the securities in the 
CAC40 fell by around 40% since the integration of exchanges in the Euronext system. This effect appears 
to be due to the increase in market liquidity stemming from the larger pool of securities and the growth in 
cross-border trading, which has beneﬁ  ted the most liquid securities on the Paris stock exchange.












November 2003: integration of cash trading 
and clearing for the four exchanges
May 2001: integration of cash trading 
for Brussels and Paris
1998 1999 1997 2002 2003 2000 2001 2004
Implicit costs Explicit costs
Note: Transaction costs across Euronext markets correspond to the average 
transaction costs of each market weighted by the year-end market capitalisation.
Source : Elkins-McSherry and own calculations.
Changes in transaction costs 
on the Paris stock exchange
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3  Although the reasons for this are unclear, one explanation may be that, in bear markets, when investors sell securities they are less concerned about how the 
transaction is executed than when they buy.
4  Since 2 January 1999, the tick sizes expressed in euro for shares and related securities are 0.01 up to EUR 50, 0.05 from EUR 50 to EUR 100, 0.10 from EUR 100 to 
EUR 500, and 0.5 above EUR 500.
5  Pagano and Padilla (2005): “Efﬁ  ciency gains from the integration of exchanges: lessons from the Euronext “natural experiment”, Report for Euronext, LECG.ARTICLES
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APPENDIX 3
Block trading on Euronext Paris
The block trading market, sometimes also referred to as the upstairs market, exists on all stock markets. It refers 
to all large transactions executed outside the regulated market, via a broker that can act as counterparty for 
the transaction (broker-dealer) or that can ﬁ  nd a counterparty through one or more dealers. Block trading is 
regulated to varying degrees across countries. In the United States, dealers generally offer a price at least as good 
as that of the listing venue. On European exchanges where the concentration rule applies, such as Euronext 
Paris and Borsa Italiana, execution conditions are entirely regulated in terms of the size of the transaction and 
the price.1
All cash products are traded electronically on the NSC system adopted by all of the Euronext members.2 NSC 
is a fully automated trading platform that allows members to route orders to a central order book where they 
are electronically matched. The orders entered into the system are directly matched according to pre-deﬁ  ned 
conditions concerning the size and possibly the price, validity date, etc.
Even though the vast majority of French residents’ equity transactions are executed on Euronext Paris regulated 
markets3 in the NSC system, a certain number of measures were taken in 1994 to allow block trades to be 
executed outside the regulated market due to competition from systems that were less strict and transparent 
than the Paris stock exchange.4 These transactions eligible for block trading must reach a given size known as 
the normal block amount (NBA) that depends on the market capitalisation of the listed company. The price 
conditions then depend on the trading volume in relation to the NBA. Ordinary block trades may be carried 
out within the range of 5% around the last traded price, while structural block trades may be executed at a 
price within a range of 10% around the last traded price.5
These transactions are then reported to Euronext via 
the Trade conﬁ  rmation system (TCS). Broker-dealers 
use this reporting system for their trades that are 
generally executed outside a regulated market.6
In France, according to the report published by the 
Conseil des marchés ﬁ  nanciers (Financial Market 
Council) in November 2001, trades executed outside a 
regulated market and subject to reporting obligations 
are broken down as follows:
Block trades executed outside a regulated market 








Source: Revue CMF No. 43, November 2001, page 11
1  Note however that there is a difference between the block trading market and the upstairs market. On the upstairs market block trades are executed outside the 
regulated market, with varying degrees of regulation. It only accounts for a part of all block trades, which can also be executed on regulated markets. On the NYSE, 
a block trade is any transaction in which 10,000 shares or more of a single stock are traded.
2  These players are credit institutions and investment ﬁ  rms that have been authorised by the competent authorities, and place buy and sell orders on Euronext. 
Depending on their authorisation, they act on behalf of clients or for their own account. See “L’organisation institutionnelle et fonctionnelle des marchés 
d’Euronext”, Euronext Paris, November.
3  It is difﬁ  cult to assess for non-residents’ equity transactions given that the concentration rule only applies to residents. Furthermore, the rule does not require all 
transactions to be executed in Paris, but on any regulated market.
4  London only introduced the publication obligations of reporting regarding transaction prices in 1996.
5  The price conditions are deﬁ  ned in Euronext Rule Book, Book 1 – Harmonised Rules, Chapter 4.4.
6  Also registered in TCS are long and short positions eligible for deferred settlement (SRD), VWAP transactions, options exercises, etc. See Euronext Cash Market 
– Guide to transaction reporting 2007.ARTICLES
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Relatively few trades are executed outside a 
regulated market. For instance, Bessembinder and 
Venkataraman (2004),7 who analysed block trades on 
Euronext Paris between April 1997 and March 1998, 
observed that less than 34% were facilitated in the 
upstairs market, with the remainder being executed 
in the order book. On the NYSE, this proportion is 
calculated at 27% for the period between December 
1993 and January 1994 (Madhavan and Cheng, 1997).8
Other types of transactions are also executed outside 
the order book, but are immediately reported in the 
NSC system. The latter include cross trades, i.e. the 
simultaneous matching and execution by a single 
Euronext member of opposing buy and sell orders; they 
can be made only for securities traded continuously 
and must be executed at a price within the market’s 
best bid/ask spread at the time of execution.9
7  Bessembinder (H.) and Venkataraman (K.) (2004): “Does an electronic Stock Exchange need an upstairs market?”, Journal of Financial Economics 73(1), 3-36.
8  Madhava (A.) and Cheng (M.) (1997): “In search of liquidity: block trades in the upstairs and downstairs markets”, Review of Financial Studies 10(1), pp. 175-203.
9  See also Euronext Rule Book, Book 1 – Harmonised Rules, Chapter 4.4.
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Note: The NSC system is only for cash transactions. Derivatives transactions 
are managed on LIFFE Connect.